The widely discussed 1989 study by Spiegel and colleagues, which suggested that a psychosocial group intervention affected survival in metastatic breast cancer, was not replicated by Goodwin and colleagues in 2001. We analyze methodological issues in both studies, including issues of sampling, randomization, interpretation, and the adequacy and validity of psychosocial constructs and measures to assess hypothesized ingredients of change. The notion of psychogenicity is introduced, conceived as the ability of psychosocial interventions to elicit changes hypothesized to be linked to desired medical outcomes. These considerations lead to the conclusion that there is insufficient evidence to be able to generalize from either study for or against the notion that psychosocial interventions can affect survival in breast cancer. The failure to incorporate into research designs a comprehensive understanding of how coping patterns and related factors may interact with psychosocial interventions to influence cancer progression, and to address hypothesized mediating mechanisms is discussed. Finally, strategies are proposed for future biopsychosocial and intervention research in the field of biopsychooncology.
1
A recently published attempt by Goodwin et al to replicate the 1989 finding by Spiegel et al that women with metastatic breast cancer who received supportiveexpressive group therapy lived an average of 18 months longer than no-treatment controls, 2 reported no effect of group therapy on survival. 3 What do scientists in the field make of these contrasting results? Do we simply add this latest study to the list of studies that did not find an effect of a psychosocial intervention on cancer progression, to be counterbalanced by a list of studies which did find an effect, as Spiegel suggested in an editorial that accompanied the Goodwin et al publication ("The literature is now evenly divided: 5 of 10 published trials report that psychotherapy prolongs survival, usually modestly, in patients with cancer [p1767]")? 4 Or, as might be implied by the publication of the nonreplication in so prestigious and influential a journal as The New England Journal of Medicine, do we consider that Goodwin et al is an authoritative refutation of the Spiegel et al study of more than a decade ago, and perhaps a refutation of the entire idea that "mind matters" in affecting the course of disease?
The publication of the 2001 nonreplication is an appropriate occasion for the field of psychooncology and the broader field of behavioral medicine to reflect upon the critical question of whether psychosocial interventions can, indeed, influence medical outcomes in cancer patients, and if so, the mechanisms by which this occurs. We take this opportunity to examine more closely the study by Goodwin et al, as well as the constellation of theoretical and methodological arguments that have grown up around the 1989 study, and to offer a critical analysis of the assumptions and methods behind this program of research. We also offer recommendations for future research, which may illuminate some of the difficulties experienced by those attempting to replicate the study by Spiegel et al. At the outset, it is important to set forth our position that psychosocial factors, including interventions, can influence medical outcomes in cancer and other diseases. This position is based on clinical observations of these effects on patients over the course of 2 decades 5 ; great respect for the clinical observations reported by colleagues, including Dr Spiegel, concerning the biopsychosocial benefits of psychological interventions for cancer patients [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] ; research on psychosocial effects on medical outcomes and hypothesized mechanisms in cancer and HIV [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] ; and research in other diseases, establishing relationships and mechanisms linking psychosocial factors, interventions, and medical outcomes. [17] [18] [19] Thus, the central concern of this paper is not to question the validity of the notion that psychosocial factors and/or interventions can influence disease course, but rather to thoroughly analyze some of the research that has attempted to demonstrate and to elucidate these relationships. We will draw upon the relevant literature, as well as upon logical reasoning and methodological critiques, to contend that both the 1989 study by Spiegel et al and the 2001 study by Goodwin et al provide insufficient evidence to determine whether psychological interventions can or cannot influence survival in breast cancer. To the extent that research designs and methods fail to encompass or approximate our clinical intuition and sophistication, such research will not be able to produce a successful blueprint for a psychosocial intervention able to reliably prolong survival in cancer patients.
Fox's Critique of the 1989 Study by Spiegel et al
The study by Spiegel et al found that 50 metastatic breast cancer patients randomized to a group psychosocial intervention survived an average 18 months longer than 36 controls who did not receive this intervention. 2 The late Dr Bernard H. Fox, a brilliant psychologist and statistician who was respected internationally for his work on the epidemiology and etiology of cancer, offered an incisive critique of this study, which, unfortunately, has not been well understood and is rarely cited in any discussion of the 1989 Spiegel et al study. 20 Because this critique is directly relevant to a critical analysis of both this study and the recent study by Goodwin et al, we will summarize and elaborate upon his insights at some length.
Comparison with national and regional cancer data. In first considering the 1989 study, Fox was struck by the Kaplan-Meier survival plot in the publication, which showed that the treatment and control groups had "almost superimposable" survival curves for close to 2 years after entry into the study. Divergence of the groups began 20 months following study entry, at which time the number of patients in the treatment group was reduced to half, and in the control group, to only one third of the patients at study entry.
An unusually precise and conscientious reviewer, Dr Fox often recalculated statistics for papers he reviewed. In the case of the study by Spiegel et al, he scrutinized data printouts from the published study as well as unpublished data provided by Dr Spiegel, and obtained from the National Cancer Institute's Surveillance, Epidemiology and End Results (SEER) Program data on survival among female breast cancer patients with demographic characteristics comparable to the study sample. Dr Fox then undertook a comparison of data from the 1989 study with the national and regional cohorts from SEER, transforming Spiegel's data into the life-table format used in the SEER program. He showed that there were almost no differences between the survival curves of the SEER national cohort and the SEER San Francisco-Oakland area cohort. Therefore, he decided to use only the latter to compare with Spiegel's study, which was conducted at Stanford, in case there were subtle, unmeasured differences between breast cancer patients nationally and those in the San Francisco area.
Fox's comparison indicated that after 20 months, the point at which survival curves of Spiegel's treatment and control groups began to diverge, large and significant differences also emerged between Spiegel's control group and the SEER population survival curve. The survival curve for Spiegel's treatment group was similar in form to the survival curve for the general population of patients described in SEER, although Spiegel's treatment group had marginally poorer survival. The survival curve for Spiegel's control group, those patients who had not received the therapy intervention, differed in both shape and magnitude from SEER population norms. Spiegel's control group curve was unusually steep, lacking a tail, and survival times were significantly shorter than in the SEER curve. Fox concluded that, due to the unusually poor survival of members of Spiegel's control group (in comparison to regional population norms), the study "appeared to yield an influence of the intervention (p366)," 20 when in actuality, Spiegel's treatment group fared no better than women from the same general locale with metastatic breast cancer who had not enrolled in the study at all.
Fox's reinterpretation of the study's results. Fox hypothesized that the 12 control patients remaining after 20 months were an extremely aberrant sample, subject to the influence of possible confounding risk factors not measured or accounted for in the study. Only by putting the Spiegel et al study in the context of national and regional breast cancer data and norms did it become clear that the apparently beneficial effect of the treatment group was most likely a chance finding based on the much shorter than expected survival of those control group patients who remained in the study after 20 months. Corollaries to Fox's main hypothesis are that: (1) the intervention had little or no effect on the treatment group; (2) the survival curve for the intervention group was equivalent to a control curve with mild sampling departures from that of the regional population; and therefore, (3) attempts to replicate the 1989 study would not yield confirmation of the original results, which were most likely chance findings. Thus, the nonreplication of the 1989 study by Goodwin et al 3 may be seen as support for Fox's 1998 hypothesis and its corollaries. Certainly, it is the case that no data presented subsequently have refuted Fox's analysis.
Considering Randomization in the 2 Studies
Spiegel argued that the use of randomized assignment obviates the need to consider whether the groups participating in a study are representative of the population from which they have been drawn, asserting that "randomization assures that differences in outcome are due to differences in treatment, rather than to inadequate matching of subjects (p371)." 21 Here, it is clear that Spiegel has misunderstood Fox's point regarding randomization as the "most effective and biasfree methodology," which nevertheless cannot guarantee that there will not be differences between the 2 groups, some of which could be significant and meaningfully related to study outcomes. 20 A small sample size, as in Spiegel's original control group (n = 36) and the even smaller group of 20-month survivors (n = 12), is particularly vulnerable to the vicissitudes of chance loading of possible confounds into one or the other of the randomized groups, compromising the effects of randomization, biasing the outcome, and casting doubt upon the interpretation of results. Conversely, the larger the sample (the multicenter study by Goodwin et al was almost 3 times larger than Spiegel's full sample), the more likely it is that unmeasured risk factors with independent effects will be distributed evenly in the 2 randomized groups.
In response to Fox's cogent re-interpretation of the 1989 study's major findings, Spiegel argued that the ultimate answer will "only come from convergent evidence from different sites and different studies rather than microsurgery on extant studies (p374)." 21 He cited the (then on-going) replication trial by Goodwin et al as a prospective source of such evidence. Indeed, examination of the 2001 study does illuminate the debate between Fox and Spiegel on the issue of important group differences that could potentially exist in spite of randomization.
Comparison of the treatment and control groups in the study by Goodwin et al reveals that the randomly selected groups were, in fact, significantly different with regard to a number of important factors that have been shown to affect prognosis: age at initial diagnosis, menopausal status, nodal stage, adjuvant chemotherapy, and progesterone-receptor status. Goodwin et al noted that, of these variables, only progesteronereceptor status was significantly related to survival in their sample. Thus, they argue that these initial differences between the groups are unlikely to have had a significant effect on group survival. 3 The fact remains, however, that in this study, which had a considerably larger N than Spiegel's original sample (N = 235, 158 assigned to the intervention group and 77 controls), random assignment failed to produce groups of equivalent patient composition. This is a sobering reminder that random assignment merely makes group differences less likely, rather than eliminating them entirely. Neither Fox nor Spiegel was able to identify specific measured factors by which Spiegel's treatment and control groups differed at the time of study entry or initial diagnosis. The fact that significant differences can exist in measured variables (as seen in the 2001 study) does, however, suggest that significant differences may also exist in unmeasured variables, which may affect outcome. The study by Goodwin et al provides supportive evidence for Fox's contention that random assignment does not ensure comparable groups. Fox's hypothesis that Spiegel's treatment and control groups differed by some unmeasured and therefore as-yet unidentifiable factor, which accounted for the difference in survival rates, remains, therefore, not only a viable but a compelling argument.
The 2001 Study by Goodwin et al
Our methodological critique of this study will focus on the adequacy of the psychological constructs and measures cited as evidence of therapeutic effectiveness. Much as vaccine research requires evidence of an experimental agent's immunogenicity (the ability to stimulate desired immune responses in recipients) before Phase III clinical trials may begin to assess the agent's ability to protect against adverse health outcomes, research on psychological interventions must first demonstrate that the treatment is psychologically potent before asserting that it affects critical health outcomes. The demonstrated ability of an intervention to produce hypothesized psychological changes may be referred to as psychogenicity, and is a key factor in interpreting study outcomes. Thus, as Spiegel has also pointed out, 4 efforts to interpret the finding of Goodwin et al that their intervention did not affect survival must first address the question of whether the intervention produced the intended psychological effects in participants.
Goodwin et al stated that the "beneficial psychosocial effects" of the intervention "are evidence that supportive-expressive group therapy was delivered effectively in our study (p1724)." 3 Similarly, in his accompanying comment, Spiegel asserted that "the fact that the patients who participated in group therapy had significantly less distress and pain than control patients is evidence of the effectiveness of the psychosocial intervention (p1767)." 4 We disagree, however, that Goodwin et al presented sufficient evidence upon which to base these conclusions.
Changes in a Measure of Mood Do Not Constitute Evidence for Psychogenicity
Several "secondary outcomes" were apparently assessed in the overall study, but the 2001 publication 3 reported only on the 2 "psychological elements" that the authors said were found to be affected by the intervention in the 1989 study of Spiegel et al: mood and pain. Our main critique focuses on the construct of mood, which was measured in the Goodwin et al study by the Profile of Mood States (POMS). It is unclear, however, whether mood per se was either assessed in the Spiegel et al study, or found to be significantly affected by the intervention. The 1989 publication by Spiegel et al did not mention that mood was assessed, but did indicate that the intervention "significantly reduced anxiety, depression, and pain . . . (p890)," 2 and more generally, "has been reported to improve the psychological well-being" (of patients with metastatic breast cancer (p888) 2 in a previous publication. 22 It is unclear, therefore, why Goodwin et al did not undertake or present in the 2001 publication a more comprehensive assessment of psychological wellbeing, but chose to focus on the assessment of mood, a state, not a trait variable, which fluctuates normally in most people several times a day. The POMS asks about mood states over the past week. 23 It would seem, however, that what is more appropriately called for is not a measurement of ephemeral or transient states, but rather, a determination of whether the psychological intervention affected more stable (ie, habitual, traitlike) psychosocial factors over the course of 6 months to a year (the follow-up psychological assessment points), and thus, could be capable of having an effect on survival years later.
A related problem is that Goodwin et al appear to have intended to measure, and indeed state that they have measured, "psychological functioning"(in their abstract and on p 1720) and "distress"(throughout the paper). When using psychological measures, it is important to be precise about the constructs being assessed, as well as about the validity of the measures to assess the critical constructs. The POMS is a measure of mood, and cannot substitute for the assessment of either "psychological functioning" or of "distress," for which there are specific, well-validated instruments. If such measures were included in the assessments of Goodwin et al, it is incumbent upon them to publish these results to support their assertions. Certainly, fluctuations in self reports of the past week's mood cannot be used as evidence of stable changes in psychological functioning.
In sum, we contend that the 2001 Goodwin et al study presented an inadequate measure of the intervention's psychogenicity, and thus failed to demonstrate that their intervention had psychological potency sufficient to produce changes in medical outcomes. Without such a demonstration, this study cannot purport to be a conclusive refutation of the hypothesis that a psychosocial intervention for patients with breast cancer, equivalent to the intervention in the study by Spiegel et al, can affect survival. It is important to note that we are not contending that the psychosocial intervention deployed in this study was ineffective; rather, we argue that the investigators did not provide conclusive evidence to establish its longterm psychogenicity.
Limitations of Self-Report Measures
We contend that the use of a self-report measure of mood is not only an inadequate assessment of the intervention's psychogenicity, but that it is not a valid measure of cancer patients' true levels of distress or mood disturbance. There is a large literature on the "repressive" tendencies of many cancer patients to deny or minimize psychological distress. 5 For over 20 years, the senior author's program of research has focused on the "Type C" coping style of those malignant melanoma and HIV patients who have been found to progress more rapidly than expected based on medical prognostic indicators. 5, [13] [14] [15] [16] 24 Type C has been defined operationally as a constellation of (a) cognitive proclivities, including decreased awareness of needs, feelings, and bodily sensations, while attending to perceived needs of others; (b) verbal and nonverbal expressive patterns, including repressing or not expressing emotion (particularly anger) while presenting a pleasant façade; and (c) specific behavioral characteristics and coping strategies, including being unassertive, appeasing, and compliant with external authorities, while denying or minimizing problems. Type C was conceived as the polar opposite of the Type A pattern, but, when deployed chronically, equally problematic to psychological and physical health, in comparison to the adaptive Type B pattern. 25 Type C coping is particularly difficult to assess because the unexpressed, underlying so-called "negative" emotions, particularly anger, are inaccessible to conscious recognition, and thus cannot be accurately self-reported. Self-report scales (such as the POMS) assume that people are aware of their emotions, moods, and bodily sensations, and can therefore report them accurately. These types of self-report measures are not valid assessments of the mental phenomena of individuals who typically cope with stress using the Type C pattern. 26 Researchers have devised a number of ways to circumvent the problem of measuring phenomena that cannot be accurately self-reported. For example, Weinberger et al used 2 self-report measures in tandem, one about manifest anxiety and the other measuring the tendency to give socially desirable answers to questionnaire items. 27 People who reported high anxiety in conjunction with low social desirability scores were designated the "truly anxious," while those who reported low anxiety but also had high social desirability scores were deemed "repressors." This and other measures of repression have been found to be highly correlated with Type C coping. 12 The Type C coping pattern has been reliably and validly assessed by methods other than self-report, including ratings of emotional expressiveness on videotaped interviews, and the discrepancy between physiological responsiveness and psychological self-report. [12] [13] [14] A relatively recent development in the assessment of Type C coping is the Vignette Similarity Rating Method (VSRM), in which the task is to rate similarity to a person in a brief story or vignette who is depicted as thinking, feeling, and behaving in characteristic Type C ways. The task of rating similarity to someone else (ie, the person in the vignette) appears to minimize the Type C defensiveness about reporting socially undesirable states and behaviors, which confounds assessment in scales composed of items which ask directly whether a person feels or acts in certain ways. 16, 28, 29, 30 
Seemingly Paradoxical Results in Studies of Cancer Patients Using Self-Report Measures
A study dating back to 1979 illustrates the conundrums in interpreting the results of self-report measures in studies of cancer patients. This study is particularly relevant to our current discussion because it concerned psychosocial factors predicting longer-(greater than 1 year) or shorter-term (less than 1 year) survival in patients with metastatic breast cancer. 31 Derogatis et al 31 found that longer-term survivors, compared to shorter-term survivors, had significantly higher levels of baseline psychological distress (measured by an appropriate instrument, the 90-item Symptom Check List), and scored significantly higher on anxiety, depression, guilt, and hostility, as well as total negative affect. What is paradoxical to the more naïve observer, who may assume that greater psychological well-being should predict better medical outcomes, is that the patients who survived the longest were the ones who were the most distressed and disturbed.
These results are consistent, however, with the results of studies on Type C and other forms of coping, in which the expression of negative emotion is associated with better medical prognosis and outcomes in studies of melanoma and HIV progression, while Type C nonexpression of negative affect is associated with unfavorable outcomes. [13] [14] [15] [16] 30 Moreover, the results are congruent with the burgeoning literature on the relationship of unexpressed emotion to biological processes and outcomes for a number of diseases. 19, 32, 33 It is striking that Goodwin et al did not cite the relevant psychooncology literature to indicate that they were aware of the relationship between lower selfreport (or less expression) of negative emotion and more unfavorable medical outcomes in cancer (shorter survival, faster progression). This absence is the more striking because Spiegel and Classen's treatment manual, 6 which outlined the program of therapy also used by Goodwin et al, clearly conveys the authors' conviction that encouraging expression of emotion (versus suppression or repression) is a critical element of supportive-expressive therapy. Thus, there appears to have been a clinical awareness of the maladaptiveness of unexpressed emotion, which, nonetheless, did not inform the choice of research measures or interpretation of empirical data.
In the context of this omission, Goodwin et al faced a puzzling problem of interpretation when discussing the results of their intervention. The data revealed a significant interaction between baseline POMS and pain perception scores and changes on these measures at 6 and 12 months. The intervention effect for these variables was only demonstrated among women who reported high baseline levels of negative mood or pain. The authors speculated that this interaction may have resulted from a "floor effect" (the questionnaires could not detect improvement when baseline levels were low), and attributed changes over time to an "effect of treatment" ("women who were initially more distressed benefited from the intervention, whereas women who were not as distressed did not benefit [p1722]"). 3 This explanation makes a number of assumptions that are not supported by their data, and that run counter to the literature cited above on the Type C coping style and the relationship of the nonexpression of negative affect and cancer outcomes. Significantly, the authors took at face value all self-reports of "distress" and pain, making no distinctions between women who may have more or less of the Type C tendency to minimize their report of negative states and emotions.
We would propose a different hypothesis to explain the observed interaction: that the women with high baseline reports of "distress" and pain may be less Type C and more expressive of their feelings and experiences. When the low Type C women expressed their needs and feelings in the intervention group, they received important social support, feedback about how they were coping, and ideas about how to deal more effectively with the situation of having cancer. In contrast, the high Type-C women (who had low baseline self-reports of mood disturbance and pain) got less out of the group intervention because they tend to keep their emotions and problems under wraps, where the issues have no chance of being understood or solved.
This explanation is consistent with the finding of Goodwin et al that for women in both the intervention and control groups who had low baseline distress levels, there was an increase in reported distress and pain levels assessed at the 6 and 12 month follow-ups. We would attribute this finding to the difficulty in maintaining a Type-C façade of equanimity in the face of continued real distress and pain. 25 The finding that there were no significant differences in outcome between the intervention and control group for those who reported low distress and pain at baseline suggests that the intervention was not effective in helping less expressive (Type-C) women express themselves better, and thus, benefit more from the group.
If this hypothesis is correct, it would follow that women in the intervention group who reported more distress and pain at baseline and whose distress levels decreased over the course of the intervention (a) would be likely to have significantly longer survival than women in either the intervention or control who reported low distress at baseline (and therefore are likely Type-C copers), and (b) would be likely to have somewhat longer survival (but not significantly so) than women in the control group who had similarly high baseline distress and pain levels. This hypothesis is consistent with the literature discussed above and with Temoshok's 1987 theory about how psychosocial interventions can alter the cancer trajectory if they stimulate or encourage patients to express emotion. 25 Expressing these feelings in a group context may help to garner social support, reduce stress levels, and find solutions to various vexing problems, thus further enhancing the hypothesized effects on medical outcomes.
Given that the encouragement of emotional expressiveness was conceptualized as a major therapeutic goal, 6 the absence of measurement techniques designed to take differences in expressiveness into account, either in measuring the psychological effects of the intervention or in exploring the relationship between expressiveness and survival, is truly puzzling. In light of their report that women who expressed high levels of negative emotion at baseline appeared to benefit more from the intervention, Goodwin et al might have analyzed their survival data separately for women high and low in expressed negative emotion. We believe it would be highly interesting and relevant to conduct such an analysis, particularly considering the report of Cunningham et al that individual differences among patients in the intervention group were significantly related to survival outcomes 9 even in the absence of an overall intervention effect. 34 Cunningham et al found that those who were more involved in the intervention, and who practiced what they had learned in the group at home (which he described as "dedicated involvement in psychological self-regulation") had longer survival than those who did not. 35 
Limitations of Both Studies in Providing Evidence for Mechanisms of Change
According to the biopsychosocial model proposed by Engel, health and disease are the cumulative and compound sequelae of interactions across biological, psychological, and social systems. 36 This model involves more than just interposing psychological and social factors into the simple cause-effect equation of the traditional biomedical model, but implies a different way of conceptualizing "cause." Indeed, when outcomes result from cascades of events across multiple systems, it is inaccurate to point to a single cause, or even a single effect. 37 In contrast to traditional biomedical research, the connections between an intervention and an outcome in biopsychosocial research are more likely to be contributory, stimulating, synergistic, multiple, and indirect, as well as to involve feedback loops. Thus, it is particularly challenging for research on psychosocial interventions to identify which factors or ingredients of an intervention, singly or in combination, might be responsible for the psychosocial and/ or biomedical changes and outcomes observed after the intervention occurred. Nevertheless, it is more or less incumbent upon biopsychosocial researchers to be able to identify such agents, ingredients, or mechanisms of change if they wish to have their psychosocial interventions seriously considered as equivalent to biomedical interventions in producing biomedical outcomes.
Logically, it is difficult to assert that a 90-minute, weekly psychotherapy group that lasts for 1 year could have a significant and permanent impact upon medical outcomes occurring as long as 9 years after the intervention itself was over, without proposing some extremely compelling mechanisms by which such an effect could occur. It is rare to find such a limited but potent intervention in biomedicine, with the exception of surgical procedures and the setting of broken bones, which would have a significant and continuing effect on medical outcomes years after the intervention is over. Preventive vaccines often require boosters, and most medicines for both acute and chronic conditions require consistent and repetitive dosing at frequent intervals. Thus, it may be an illuminating exercise to reflect upon the fact that a 90-minute-aweek psychotherapy group takes up only 1.5% of a person's time in a given week, assuming 14 hours of awake time in which there are many other potential influences upon a person's psychological and physical health, including spouses or partners, family members, friends, peers who also have cancer, bosses, coworkers, employees, and other people encountered during the course of a day, possibly including another individual psychotherapist or health care provider, in addition to the local physical and psychosocial environment, and the extended environment (accessible via the Internet, television, and other media, which bring often tragic and stressful national and international events into one's cognitive space). It is problematic to support the notion that the intervention received by the experimental group caused the observed changes and outcomes, compared to the control group, without being prepared to provide convincing evidence that the intervention was the sole or most important factor likely to cause the observed differences.
Hypothesized Mechanisms of Change
Other than a few lines devoted to consideration of possible mechanisms by which a psychological intervention may have reduced pain, the paper by Goodwin et al is silent on the question of potential causal mechanisms by which supportive-expressive therapy might be expected to affect breast cancer morbidity and survival. 3 Spiegel's accompanying editorial 4 offered a list of means by which mental and emotional states may affect the somatic response to cancer (eg, adherence to treatment, health behaviors), and a single reference to his own work linking the absence of normal diurnal variation in cortisol levels to early death in breast cancer patients. Elsewhere, the Spiegel group argued that reducing patients' tendencies to engage in avoidance is a critical factor in cancer treatment. 7 Overall, however, it is difficult to develop a coherent picture of the mechanisms by which the authors believe it might be possible for supportive-expressive therapy to enhance survival, by reading the published reports of the intervention studies by Spiegel et al and Goodwin et al. 2, 3 In an earlier paper, reflecting upon his 1989 study, Spiegel suggested a number of possible ways by which expressive supportive therapy might have beneficial effects on survival. 38 Elaborating upon his discussion: group members could help each other work through doctor-patient communication problems more effectively, and pursue more assertively the options for new or experimental treatments that could improve their chances for survival. Group members are encouraged to express their emotions more openly, which could lead to garnering more effective social support. Patients could have learned to cope more effectively with everyday stressors, and the consequent reductions in stress could have physiological and immunological consequences that could, in turn, have positive effects on immune surveillance mechanisms that could prevent further metastases. Group members could share with each other how to make the best use of diet, sleep, and exercise, all of which have been documented to play a role in achieving better recovery and health. 37, 38 Unfortunately, there was no evidence for or against any of these reasonable hypotheses about possible mechanisms in the 1989 study by Spiegel et al, nor in any other subsequent data-based publication by this group.
Spiegel and Classen's treatment manual for supportive-expressive therapy elaborates at greater length on what they believe to be the essential elements of his therapy. 6 Among the goals of therapy, as outlined in the treatment manual, is the development of close supportive bonds between patients, enhancing the open expression of emotions, "detoxifying" death and dying, redefining life priorities, increasing social support from others, improving the doctor-patient relationship, and enhancing coping. 6 Clinical anecdotes were used with great skill to exemplify the role of each of these goals in therapy, and the positive effects each of these therapeutic elements on patients' lives. As has often been pointed out, however, "the plural of 'anecdote' is not 'data.'" It is difficult to discern from the treatment manual whether the effectiveness of these specific therapeutic components has ever been systematically evaluated by Spiegel and his colleagues.
Spiegel and Classen touched upon a large body of literature supporting the global effectiveness of psychological interventions for improving the mood and psychological functioning of cancer patients. 6 They provided a general discussion of the role of stress and social support in physical health, referring generally to the psychoneuroimmunology literature. They also referred to the possible role of group therapy in enhancing adherence, but did not cite studies or provide their own data-based evidence to support this contention. Missing in this review was any systematic, empirically-supported theory of how supportiveexpressive therapy achieves its psychological effects or enhances survival times. Furthermore, the data that were provided to support the effectiveness of specific components of supportive-expressive therapy were often incomplete or tangential.
For example, Classen and Spiegel reported that social support was associated with improved health outcome, citing the 1989 study by Spiegel et al as evidence. However, that study reported no direct measurements of social support, changes in social support, or satisfaction with social support over time. Additionally, although it might be assumed that social support would naturally increase via group participation, to ascribe the effects of treatment to greater social support, it would be necessary to demonstrate that there was a relationship between changes in perceived social support and improvements in survival time. No such demonstration was included in the 1989 report of Spiegel et al.
A second example of inconclusive or unsupported claims of possible mechanisms for the effects of group therapy on medical outcomes is the premise of Classen et al that a critical element of treatment is the reduction of avoidance, 7 referred to elsewhere as the "detoxification of death." 6 Classen et al made this assertion in the context of their finding that Impact of Event (IES) scale scores declined across 1 year of supportiveexpressive therapy. However, Classen et al reported only their analyses of global IES scores, when in fact, the IES is made up of two factors, one measuring Intrusion and the other Avoidance. 39 The claim that supportive-expressive therapy involves important reductions in avoidance cannot be supported by data in which avoidance scores are aggregated with intrusive symptoms.
Conclusions and Recommendations for Future Research in Biopsychooncology
Although both the randomized clinical trials presented by Spiegel et al 2 and Goodwin et al 3 were careful and well-conducted, neither paper presented sufficient evidence to support the generalization from their results that psychosocial interventions can 2 or cannot 3 affect survival in metastatic breast cancer patients. This analysis is based on considerations of psychogenicity as the critical criterion for deciding whether to invest the time and expense in testing a psychosocial intervention in a Phase-III trial of efficacy. The question is whether there is adequate evidence, either in the Phase-III study under consideration or from prior Phase-II studies, that elements of the intervention significantly affected psychosocial or other factors hypothesized to mediate influences on psychosocial outcomes (eg, well-being, quality of life) and/or biomedical outcomes (eg, survival).
We have argued that neither Spiegel et al nor Goodwin et al presented sufficient evidence for the psychogenicity of their interventions. The intervention of Spiegel et al was not hypothesized originally to affect survival, 2 but was only found to do so retrospectively. It is therefore understandable that these investigators were not able to present evidence of the intervention's psychogenicity in terms of demonstrating that the intervention was able to elicit specific changes related to prolonged survival by hypothesized mediating mechanisms. A multicenter replication study published 12 years later 3 has some scientific obligation, however, to address limitations of the previous study 2 and to demonstrate psychogenicity, particularly if there are cogent arguments that the prior findings were likely due to chance, and that attempts at replication would not yield confirmation of the original study. 20 A Type-II error is more likely if one concludes that psychosocial interventions do not prolong survival in women with metastatic breast cancer, generalizing from a randomized clinical trial of an intervention with low or unproven psychogenicity. It is as if someone trained 200 Shetland ponies to jump, put them in a show ring where they were aimed at 5-foot jumps, which of course none could clear, and then concluded that no horse is able to clear a 5-foot jump, based on the evidence from this large sample of very well-trained Shetland ponies.
With these considerations in mind, we offer a number of recommendations that we hope may be useful in guiding future studies in the field of biopsychooncology, to adopt the apt term introduced by Dr Keith Block. 40 1. Psychosocial interventions should be composed of factors for which there is converging evidence of psychogenicity and predictive validity for biomedical cancer outcomes. The notion of psychogenicity is intrinsically tied to hypothesizing and demonstrating plausible mediating mechanisms for the observed relationships between an intervention and an outcome. To demonstrate psychogenicity, it must be shown that an intervention significantly and permanently changed key psychosocial factors, which in turn, are demonstrably linked to biological factors shown to influence medical outcomes. Taking a cue from biomedical clinical trial researchers, biopsychooncology researchers should base Phase-III efficacy trials on Phase-II studies that demonstrate the psychogenicity of promising factors. In biopsychooncology and more broadly, the field of behavioral medicine, a number of studies have provided evidence that coping styles (relatively stable cognitive, emotional, interpersonal, and physiological tendencies and patterns of dealing with stress and maintaining homeostasis) can affect health outcomes. 5, 9, [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] 41, 42 One of the main challenges in the field is to devise methods to assess adaptive or maladaptive coping that have high predictive validity for biological processes and outcomes. Another challenge is to be able to demonstrate that coping patterns can be changed and that the more adaptive coping pattern can be maintained over time. 43 Perhaps the largest challenge is how to integrate the most effective change agents or influences into a potent intervention that is feasible, testable, and effective. 2. To advance the field, it is critical to understand how interventions work and for whom, rather than merely compiling a catalog of instances in which interventions do or do not work. Much would be gained from increased attention to measuring process variables by which a successful intervention produces its effects, and individual differences in treatment response. Little can be discerned about how psychosocial interventions induce change by simply collecting "snapshots" of patients' emotional states at discrete points in time. At a minimum, when a therapeutic model includes specific claims about the active ingredients of treatment, evaluations of that model should include specific assessments of each component believed to be critical to treatment success. The work of Cunningham et al 9, 35 provides an excellent example of the importance of assessing individual differences and process variables. If Cunningham et al, like many others in the field, had been limited to pre-and post-intervention measures of psychological outcome variables, they would have been able to report nothing more than an unsuccessful intervention. 34 Instead, their measurement of process variables allowed them to discern that individual differences in the degree of active engagement in therapy had a significant effect on survival times, despite the absence of a global intervention effect. This insight enhances our ability to develop and implement future interventions, and to better understand individual differences in treatment response. Adequate analysis of process variables and individual differences is no less important in studies that do produce global intervention effects.
3. An additional requirement for methodological adequacy in biopsychooncology studies is that measures of psychological change must extend beyond selfreport. As was discussed in detail above, both the inadequate validity of self-report and the clinical implications of incongruities between self-reported and "actual" distress (as assessed, for example, physiologically) have been noted in a number of psychooncology and biopsychosocial studies. [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] 19, 27, [30] [31] [32] [33] In light of these findings, it is incumbent upon treatment researchers to provide additional measures of psychological change, not based in self-report, if they wish to assert that their therapy has been effective. Possible methods of validating self-reports may include ratings by skilled clinicians unaffiliated with the treatment program, ratings from videotapes of patient interviews, reports from collaterals (family members, medical providers), behavioral observations, psychophysiological assessments, or other methods which minimize social desirability and demand characteristics. 28, 29 It is particularly important to consider the potential role of demand characteristics when assessing patients who have become invested in a long-term therapy group to which they may have developed considerable allegiance. Patients are undoubtedly aware that the therapy they have experienced was intended to affect factors such as mood and symptoms of distress; thus, their responses to self-report measures of these characteristics may be unduly influenced by their desire to give the "right" answers and show support or gratitude for their group leaders.
In sum, there are both conscious and unconscious factors that may influence patients to report a reduction in mood disturbance following an intervention, or simply to be unaware or unable to articulate distress that is evident on the physiological level. Thus, we argue that self-report instruments must be supplemented by additional methods of assessment if a study is to be considered definitive proof of a positive intervention effect. 4. There must be continued efforts to document the degree to which random assignment has produced identical groups. The inability of Spiegel et al 2 and Goodwin et al 3 to achieve fully comparable intervention and control groups is evidence, not of researcher carelessness, but of the inadequacy of the best available research methods. There is no preferable substitute for random assignment, and we do not argue that randomized clinical trials should be replaced by some other form of research design. Rather, we believe that researchers must make an extensive effort to compare experimental and control groups on a wide variety of psychosocial and biobehavioral variables that could affect outcome, 40 and to consider the representativeness of their samples through additional comparisons to reference or population groups. 44 5. In truly biopsychosocial or biopsychooncological research, 28, 36, 37, 40, 45 it is necessary to develop integrative models in which both psychological and biological processes are included. It is essential that we develop models of the mechanisms by which our psychosocial interventions may influence biological processes that, in turn, are associated with various medical outcomes. Although multiple hypotheses have been put forth regarding the nature of biopsychosocial interactions, these hypotheses have yet to be tested comprehensively and systematically within the context of randomized clinical trials of psychological interventions in cancer patients.
We strongly recommend the integration of careful measures of biological factors (eg, immune parameters, cytokines, homeostatic processes) and biomedical outcomes (eg, progression, survival) into all studies of the psychological processes underlying psychosocial interventions in cancer patients. A good example of this is the study by Fawzy et al of a shortterm intervention for melanoma patients. 46 It is no longer enough (if it ever was) to conceive of an intervention trial as a "black box" experiment in which there is no attempt to systematically examine the internal processes by which change does and does not occur. 6. As most participants in the debate surrounding these studies agree, 2, 3, 9, 20, 21 randomized clinical trials remain the best available design for testing the efficacy of an intervention. We would suggest, however that we need more appropriate methods to advance the science of understanding how psychosocial interventions work, and how they can work better to influence desirable health outcomes. Part of the problem is the inadequacy of the randomized clinical trial design, as it has been translated from biomedical to biopsychooncological research, to mirror the complexity of processes and cascading events that describe change over time for individuals who have cancer, and to attribute causal influence in medical outcomes to a given intervention when so many factors are implicated directly and indirectly. Adding complexity to our models necessarily makes the task of the clinical researcher more difficult; however, there is no alternative if we want to gain a more veridical picture of the nature and process of human change, and if our ultimate goal is to develop effective psychosocial interventions that can benefit the health and wellbeing of our patients.
